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Abstract
For cooperative games with transferable utility, convexity has turned out
to be an important and widely applicable concept. Convexity can be defined
in a number of ways, each having its own specific attractions. Basically, these
definitions fall into two categories, namely those based on a supermodular
interpretation and those based on a marginalistic interpretation. For games
with non-transferable utility, however, the literature only offers two kinds of
convexity, ordinal and cardinal convexity, which both extend the supermod-
ular interpretation. In this paper, we introduce and analyse three new types
of convexity for NTU-games that generalise the marginalistic interpretation
of convexity.
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1 Introduction
The notion of convexity for cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games)
was introduced by Shapley (1971) and is one of the most analysed properties in
cooperative game theory. Many economic and combinatorial situations give rise to
convex (or concave) cooperative games, such as airport games (cf. Littlechild and
Owen (1973)), bankruptcy games (cf. Aumann and Maschler (1985)) and sequencing
games (cf. Curiel et al. (1989)).
Convexity for TU-games can be defined in a number of equivalent ways. One
of these is by means of the supermodularity property, which has its origins outside
the field of game theory. Vilkov (1977) and Sharkey (1981) have extended this
property towards cooperative games with non-transferable utility (NTU-games) to
define ordinal and cardinal convexity, respectively. The supermodular interpretation
of convexity also plays an important role in the context of effectivity functions
(cf. Abdou and Keiding (1991)).
Economically more appealing than this supermodular interpretation of convexity
are the definitions of convexity that are based on the concept of marginal contribu-
tions. In cooperative games with stochastic payoffs, this marginalistic interpretation
of convexity has already been succesfully applied (cf. Timmer et al. (2000) and
Suijs (2000)). For NTU-games, however, such an extension has not yet been made.
In this paper, we define three new types of convexity for NTU-games, which are
based on three corresponding marginalistic convexity properties for TU-games.
Although all five convexity properties for NTU-games coincide within the sub-
class of TU-games, this is not the case in general. In this paper we analyse the
relations between these convexity concepts. In addition, we investigate the convex-
ity properties in special classes of NTU-games, such as hyperplane games, 1-corner
games and bargaining games.
Convex TU-games have some nice properties. In this paper we focus on three of
these: for convex TU-games, the Shapley value belongs to the core, semi-convexity is
satisfied and the bargaining set coincides with the core. We find that semi-convexity
can be extended to NTU-games in such a way that it is satisfied if either of the five
convexity notions holds. It is shown that the first property can be extended to
NTU-games that satisfy the three marginalistic convexity properties in some classes
of NTU-games. We show that the third property cannot be extended for general
NTU-games.
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This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we introduce some notation
and basic definitions. In Section 3, three new types of convexity for NTU-games
are introduced. In Section 4, we investigate how the various types of convexity
are related and in Section 5, we look at some specific classes of games. Finally, in
Section 6, we relate the different types of convexity to various solution concepts for
NTU-games.
2 Notation and Basic Definitions
The set of all real numbers is denoted by R, the set of nonnegative reals by R+
and the set of nonpositive reals by R−. For a finite set N , we denote its power
set by 2N = {S |S ⊂ N} and its number of elements by |N |. By RN we denote
the set of all real-valued functions on N . An element of RN is denoted by a vector
x = (xi)i∈N . For S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅, we denote the restriction of x on S by xS = (xi)i∈S.
For x, y ∈ RN, y ≥ x denotes yi ≥ xi for all i ∈ N and y > x denotes yi > xi for all
i ∈ N .
A cooperative game with transferable utility, or TU-game, is described by a pair
(N, v), where N = {1, . . . , n} denotes the set of players and v : 2N → R is the
characteristic function, assigning to every coalition S ⊂ N of players a value v(S),
representing the total payoff to this group of players when they cooperate. By
convention, v(∅) = 0.
An allocation of v(S) is a vector x ∈ RS such that
∑
i∈S xi ≤ v(S), with xi
representing the payoff to player i ∈ S. An allocation x of v(S) is called Pareto
efficient if
∑
i∈S xi = v(S). The core C(V ) is the set of Pareto efficient allocations
of v(N) for which it holds that no coalition S ⊂ N has an incentive to split off:







A TU-game (N, v) is called superadditive if for all coalitions S, T ⊂ N such that
S ∩ T = ∅ we have
v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ).
An ordering of the players in N is a bijection σ : {1, . . . , n} → N , where σ(i) denotes
which player in N is at position i. The set of all n! permutations of N is denoted
by Π(N). The marginal vector of a TU-game (N, v) corresponding to the order
σ ∈ Π(N) is defined by
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mσσ(k)(v) = v({σ(1), . . . , σ(k)})− v({σ(1), . . . , σ(k− 1)})
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
A cooperative game with non-transferable utility, or NTU-game, is described by
a pair (N, V ), where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players and V is the payoff map
assigning to each coalition S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅ a subset V (S) of RS such that, for all
i ∈ N ,
V ({i}) = (−∞, 0]
and for all S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅ we have
V (S) is nonempty, closed and convex,
V (S) is comprehensive, i.e., x ∈ V (S) and y ≤ x imply y ∈ V (S),
V (S) ∩RS+ is bounded.
In addition, we assume that (N, V ) is monotonic: for all S ⊂ T ⊂ N,S 6= ∅ and for
all x ∈ V (S) there exists a y ∈ V (T ) such that yS ≥ x. Note that we do not define
V (∅). For all S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅ we define V ◦(S) = V (S) × 0N\S and V ◦(∅) = 0N . The
class of NTU-games with player set N is denoted by NTUN . For ease of notation,
we sometimes use V rather than (N, V ) to denote an NTU-game.
NTU-games generalise TU-games. Every TU-game (N, v) gives rise to an NTU-
game (N, V ) by defining V (S) = {x ∈ RS |
∑
i∈S xi ≤ v(S)} for all S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅.
The set of Pareto efficient allocations for coalition S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅, denoted by
Par(S), is defined by
Par(S) = {x ∈ V (S) |@y∈V (S) : y ≥ x, y 6= x},
its set of weak Pareto efficient allocations WPar(S) is defined by
WPar(S) = {x ∈ V (S) |@y∈V (S) : y > x}
and its set of individually rational allocations is defined by
IR(S) = {x ∈ V (S) | ∀i∈S : xi ≥ 0}.
The imputation set of an NTU-game (N, V ), denoted by I(V ), is defined by
I(V ) = IR(N) ∩WPar(N).
The core of an NTU-game (N, V ) consists of those elements of V (N) for which it
holds that no coalition S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅ has an incentive to split off:
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C(V ) = {x ∈ V (N) | ∀S⊂N,S 6=∅@y∈V (S) : y > xS}.
An NTU-game (N, V ) is called superadditive if for all coalitions S, T ⊂ N such that
S 6= ∅, T 6= ∅, S ∩ T = ∅ we have
V (S)× V (T ) ⊂ V (S ∪ T ).
This definition of superadditivity is a straightforward generalisation of the concept of
superadditivity for TU-games. In addition, we define a weaker property concerning
only the merger between individual players and coalitions rather than between two
arbitrary coalitions. An NTU-game (N, V ) is called individually superadditive if for
all i ∈ N and for all S ⊂ N\{i}, S 6= ∅ we have
V (S)× V ({i}) ⊂ V (S ∪ {i}).
Note that individual superadditivity is stronger than monotonicity. We define the
marginal vector mσ corresponding to the order σ ∈ Π(N) by
Mσσ(k)(V ) = max{xσ(k) | x ∈ V ({σ(1), . . . , σ(k)}),
∀i∈{1,...,k−1} : xσ(i) = M
σ
σ(i)(V )}.
for all k = 1, . . . , n. Note that we use the assumption of monotonicity to ensure
that the sets over which the maximums are taken are nonempty. By construction,
Mσ(V ) ∈ WPar(N). If a game is individually superadditive, then all marginal
vectors belong to IR(N).
3 Convexity
A TU-game (N, v) is called convex if it satisfies the following four equivalent condi-
tions (cf. Shapley (1971) and Ichiishi (1981)):
∀S,T⊂N : v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∩ T ) + v(S ∪ T ), (3.1)
∀U⊂N∀S⊂T⊂N\U : v(S ∪ U)− v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ U)− v(T ), (3.2)
∀i∈N∀S⊂T⊂N\{i} : v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ {i})− v(T ), (3.3)
∀σ∈Π(N) : m
σ(v) ∈ C(v). (3.4)
Condition (3.1), which is called the supermodularity property, was originally stated
in Shapley (1971) as the definition of convexity for TU-games. Subsequently, Vilkov
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(1977) and Sharkey (1981) generalised this property to ordinal and cardinal convex-
ity for NTU-games, respectively. An NTU-game (N, V ) is called ordinally convex if
for all coalitions S, T ⊂ N such that S 6= ∅, T 6= ∅ and for all x ∈ RN such that
xS ∈ V (S) and xT ∈ V (T ) we have
xS∩T ∈ V (S ∩ T ) or xS∪T ∈ V (S ∪ T ). (3.5)
A game is called cardinally convex if for all coalitions S, T ⊂ N such that S 6= ∅, T 6=
∅ we have
V ◦(S) + V ◦(T ) ⊂ V ◦(S ∩ T ) + V ◦(S ∪ T ). (3.6)
In contrast with these supermodular definitions of convexity by Vilkov (1977) and
Sharkey (1981), we define three new types of convexity for NTU-games, based on the
marginalistic properties (3.2)-(3.4). First of all, we define coalition-merge convexity1,
which generalises property (3.2). For U = ∅ and S = T , (3.2) is trivial and these
cases can therefore be ignored when defining an analogous property for NTU-games.
If S = ∅, (3.2) is equivalent to superadditivity. Because we do not define V (∅) for
NTU-games, we require superadditivity as a separate condition. For S 6= ∅, (3.2)
states that for any coalition U , the marginal contribution to the larger coalition
T is larger than the marginal contribution to the smaller coalition S. In terms of
allocations, this can be interpreted as follows: given the situation in which coalitions
S and T have agreed upon a weak Pareto efficient and individually rational allocation
of v(S) and v(T ) (say, p and q, resp.), if coalition U joins the smaller coalition S, then
for any allocation r of v(S∪U) such that the players in S get at least their previous
amount (rS ≥ p), it is possible for U to join the larger coalition T using allocation
s of v(T ∪ U), which gives the players in T at least their previous amount (sT ≥ q)
and makes all players in U better off than in case they join S (sU ≥ rU ). Using this
interpretation of (3.2), we can now define an analogous property for NTU-games.
An NTU-game (N, V ) is called coalition-merge convex, if it is superadditive and
it satisfies the coalition-merge property, i.e., for all U ⊂ N such that U 6= ∅ and
all S $ T ⊂ N\U such that S 6= ∅ the following statement is true: for all p ∈
WPar(S)∩ IR(S), all q ∈ V (T ) and all r ∈ V (S ∪U) such that rS ≥ p, there exists
an s ∈ V (T ∪ U) such that
1This notion is introduced for stochastic cooperative games in Suijs and Borm (1999). The name
coalition-merge convexity and the subsequent names individual-merge and marginal convexity are
from Timmer et al. (2000)
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{
∀i∈T : si ≥ qi
∀i∈U : si ≥ ri.
(3.7)
Note that it makes no differences whether we require the coalition-merge property
for all q ∈ V (T ) or only for q ∈WPar(T )∩ IR(T ). The extension of (3.3) towards
NTU-games goes in a similar manner: an NTU-game (N, V ) is called individual-
merge convex if it is individually superadditive and it satisfies the individual-merge
property, i.e., for all k ∈ N and all S $ T ⊂ N\{k} such that S 6= ∅, the following
statement is true: for all p ∈WPar(S)∩IR(S), all q ∈ V (T ) and all r ∈ V (S∪{k})
such that rS ≥ p there exists an s ∈ V (T ∪ {k}) such that{
∀i∈T : si ≥ qi
sk ≥ rk.
(3.8)
And finally, an NTU-game (N, V ) is called marginal convex if for all σ ∈ Π(N) we
have
Mσ(V ) ∈ C(V ). (3.9)
One important aspect of the five convexity properties defined in this section is that
within the class of NTU-games that correspond to TU-games, they are all equivalent
and coincide with TU-convexity.
Another property of these concepts is the following: if an NTU-game (N, V )
satisfies some form of convexity, then all its subgames do, where the subgame of
(N, V ) with respect to coalition S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅ is defined as the NTU-game (S, V S)
with V S(T ) = V (T ) for all T ⊂ S, T 6= ∅.
4 Relations between the Five Types of Convexity
In this section we investigate the relations between the five types of convexity for
NTU-games that were presented in the previous section. For 2-player NTU-games,
all five types are equivalent to (individual) superadditivity, as is shown in Proposi-
tion 4.1.
Proposition 4.1 Let (N, V ) ∈ NTUN such that |N | = 2. Then ordinal, cardinal,
coalition-merge, individual-merge and marginal convexity are equivalent to (indi-
vidual) superadditivity.
7
Proof: For the first four convexity notions, the statement follows immediately
from the definitions. For marginal convexity, first note that (N, V ) is superadditive
if and only if V (N) ⊃ RN−. If (N, V ) is marginal convex, then both marginal vectors
belong to C(V ) ⊂ IR(N) and using comprehensiveness, this implies that (N, V ) is
superadditive. Conversely, if (N, V ) is superadditive, then both marginal vectors
are individually rational and hence belong to the core. 
For general n-player NTU-games, equivalence between the five types of convexity
does not hold. The remainder of this section shows which relations do exist between
these properties.
The following proposition states an implication, which follows immediately from
the definitions of coalition-merge and individual-merge convexity.
Proposition 4.2 If an NTU-game (N, V ) is coalition-merge convex, then it is
individual-merge convex.
The following Example shows that the reverse need not be the case.
Example 4.3 Consider the following NTU-game with player set N = {1, 2, 3, 4}:
V ({i}) = (−∞, 0] for all i ∈ N,
V (S) = {x ∈ RS | max
i∈S
xi ≤ 1} if S = {1, 2} or S = {3, 4},
V (S) = {x ∈ RS | max
i∈S
xi ≤ 0} for other S ⊂ N, |S| = 2,
V ({1, 2, 3}) = {x ∈ R{1,2,3} |x1 ≤ 1, x2 ≤ 1, x3 ≤ 0},
V ({1, 2, 4}) = {x ∈ R{1,2,4} |x1 ≤ 1, x2 ≤ 1, x4 ≤ 0},
V ({1, 3, 4}) = {x ∈ R{1,3,4} |x1 ≤ 0, x3 ≤ 1, x4 ≤ 1},
V ({2, 3, 4}) = {x ∈ R{2,3,4} |x2 ≤ 0, x3 ≤ 1, x4 ≤ 1},




This game is not superadditive and therefore not coalition-merge convex2: take
S = {1, 2}, T = {3, 4}, then (1, 1) ∈ V (S) and (1, 1) ∈ V (T ), but (1, 1, 1, 1) /∈
2One can even construct an individual-merge convex game that is superadditive, but which
does not satisfy the coalition-merge property.
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V (S ∪ T ). This game does, however, satisfy individual-merge convexity. First,
individual superadditivity can easily be checked to be satisfied. Next, let k ∈ N ,
let S $ T ⊂ N\{k} such that S 6= ∅ and let p ∈ WPar(S) ∩ IR(S), q ∈ V (T ) and
r ∈ V (S ∪ {k}) such that rS ≥ p. Define s = (q, rk) ∈ RT∪{k}. If |T | = 3, we have
T ∪ {k} = N . Because
∑
i∈T qi ≤ 2 and rk ≤ 1 (which follows from |S| ≤ 2), we
have
∑
i∈N si ≤ 3 and hence, s ∈ V (N). If T = {1, 2} or T = {3, 4}, we have |S| = 1
and rk ≤ 0 and because of individual superadditivity, s ∈ V (T ∪ {k}). Finally,
for other coalitions T with |T | = 2, we have maxi∈T qi ≤ 0, rk ≤ 1 and therefore
s ∈ V (T ∪ {k}). Hence, this game satisfies the individual-merge property. /
In the following lemma, we show that individual-merge convexity implies marginal
convexity.
Proposition 4.4 Let (N, V ) ∈ NTUN . If (N, V ) is individual-merge convex, then
it is marginal convex.
Proof: Assume (N, V ) is individual-merge convex and let σ ∈ Π(N). To simplify
notation, assume without loss of generality that σ(i) = i for all i ∈ N . We prove that
Mσ(V ) ∈ C(V ) by induction on the player set. For this, we define for k = 1, . . . , n
the subgame (Nk, V k) whereNk = {1, . . . , k} and V k(S) = V (S) for all S ⊂ Nk, S 6=
∅. For k = 1, Mσ(V k) ∈ C(V k) by construction. Next, let k ∈ {2, . . . , n} and
assume Mσ(V k−1) ∈ C(V k−1). We show that Mσ(V k) ∈ C(V k), i.e., no coalition
has an incentive to leave the “grand” coalition Nk. Define T = {1, . . . , k − 1} and
let S $ T, S 6= ∅. Then it is sufficient to show that coalitions S, T , {k}, T ∪ {k}
and S ∪ {k} have no incentive to split off:
• Because Mσ(V k−1) ∈ C(V k−1), by definition there does not exist an y ∈ V (S)
such that y > MσS (V
k−1). By construction, MσS (V
k) = MσS (V
k−1), so there
does not exist an y ∈ V (S) such that y > MσS (V
k). Hence, coalition S has no
incentive to leave Nk when the payoff is Mσ(V k). The same argument holds
for coalition T .
• Player k will not deviate on his own, because individual-merge convexity im-
plies individual superadditivity and hence, Mσ(V k) ∈ IR(V k).
• Because Mσ,k(V k) ∈ WPar(Nk), there exists no y ∈ V k(Nk) such that y >
Mσ,k(V k) and hence, the ”grand” coalition T ∪{k} has no incentive to deviate.
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• Finally, we show that coalition S ∪ {k} has no incentive to split off. Define
R = {r ∈ V (S∪{k}) | rS ≥MσS (V
k)} to be the set of allocations in V (S∪{k})
according to which the players in S get at least the amount they get according
to the marginal vector Mσ(V k) . If R = ∅, then S ∪ {k} will be satisfied
with the allocation Mσ(V k). Because Mσ(V k) ∈ IR(Nk), it follows from
the basic assumptions of an NTU-game that R is closed and bounded, so if
R 6= ∅, we can compute max{rk | r = (rS, rk) ∈ R}. Let r ∈ R be a point
in which this maximum is reached. Because Mσ(V k−1) ∈ C(V k−1), we must
have MσS (V
k) /∈ V (S) or MσS (V
k) ∈WPar(S). Let p be the intersection point
of the line segment between 0 and MσS (V
k) and the set WPar(S)∩IR(S). By
construction, r ∈ V (S ∪ {k}) is such that rS ≥ p.
Next, take q = Mσ(V k−1) ∈ V (T ). As a result of individual-merge convexity
and comprehensiveness, there exists an s ∈ V (T ∪ {k}) such that sT = q
and sk ≥ rk. Because sT = Mσ(V k−1), it follows from the construction of
Mσ(V k) that Mσk (V
k) ≥ sk. But then, Mσk (V
k) ≥ rk. We constructed rk as
the maximum amount player k can obtain by cooperating with coalition S,
while giving each player i ∈ S at least Mσi (V
k). We conclude that there does
not exist a y ∈ V (S ∪ {k}) such that yi > Mσi (V
k) for all i ∈ S ∪ {k}.
From these four cases we conclude Mσ(V k) ∈ C(V k) and by induction on k, we
obtain Mσ(V ) ∈ C(V ). 
In Example 4.5 we show that the reverse implication of Proposition 4.4 need not
hold.
Example 4.5 The following game with player set N = {1, 2, 3} is the NTU-
analogon of Example 4.6 in Timmer et al. (2000), which is a cooperative game
with stochastic payoffs:
V ({i}) = (−∞, 0] for all i ∈ N,
V ({1, 2}) = {x ∈ R{1,2} |x1 + x2 ≤ 3},
V ({1, 3}) = {x ∈ R{1,3} |x1 + x3 ≤ 2},
V ({2, 3}) = {x ∈ R{2,3} |x2 + x3 ≤ 6},











The marginal vectors of this games are stated in the following table, where σ =
(a, b, c) is shorthand notation for σ(1) = a, σ(2) = b and σ(3) = c.
σ (1, 2, 3) (1, 3, 2) (2, 1, 3) (2, 3, 1) (3, 1, 2) (3, 2, 1)




, 2) (3, 0, 7) (24
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and the core is given by









= 1, x1 + x3 ≥ 3, x1 + x3 ≥ 2, x2 + x3 ≥ 6}.
It is easy to check that Mσ(V ) ∈ C(V ) for all σ ∈ Π(N) and hence, (N, V ) is
marginal convex. Next, we show that this game is not individual-merge convex. Take
k = 1, S = {2}, T = {2, 3} and take p = 0 ∈ WPar(S) ∩ IR(S), q = (6, 0) ∈ V (T )
and r = (3, 0) ∈ V (S ∪{k}). Note that rS ≥ p. Suppose (N, V ) is individual-merge
convex. Then there exists an s ∈ V (T∪{k}) such that (3.8) holds, i.e., s2 ≥ 6, s3 ≥ 0







≤ 1, which gives a contradiction.
Hence, (N, V ) is not individual-merge convex. /
In the following example we show that ordinal convexity is not implied by any of
the other four types of convexity.
Example 4.6 Consider the following NTU-game with player set N = {1, 2, 3, 4}:
V ({i}) = (−∞, 0] for all i ∈ N,
V (S) = {x ∈ RS | max
i∈S
xi ≤ 1} for all S ⊂ N, |S| = 2,
V (S) = {x ∈ RS |
∑
i∈S
xi ≤ 4} for all S ⊂ N, |S| = 3,




First, we show that this game is not ordinally convex. Consider S = {1, 2, 3}, T =
{2, 3, 4} and x = (4,−3, 3, 4) ∈ RN. Then we have both xS ∈ V (S) and xT ∈ V (T ),
but neither xS∩T ∈ V (S ∩T ) nor xS∪T ∈ V (S ∪T ). Hence, (3.5) is not satisfied and
(N, V ) is not ordinally convex.
Next, we show that (N, V ) is coalition-merge convex. Let U ⊂ N,U 6= ∅ and let
S $ T ⊂ N\U such that S 6= ∅. Let p ∈ WPar(S) ∩ IR(S), let q ∈ V (T ) and let
r ∈ V (S ∪U) such that rS ≥ p. Define s = (q, rU). If |T | = 3, then
∑
i∈T qi ≤ 4 and
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rU ≤ 3. If |T | = 2 and |U | = 2, then
∑
i∈T qi ≤ 2 and
∑
i∈U ri ≤ 4. In both cases, we
have
∑
i∈T∪U si ≤ 7 and hence, s ∈ V (T ∪U) = V (N). In case |T | = 2 and |U | = 1,
we have
∑
i∈T qi ≤ 2 and rU ≤ 1 and hence,
∑
i∈T∪U si ≤ 3, implying s ∈ V (T ∪ U).
Noting that (N, V ) is superadditive, we conclude that this game is coalition-merge
convex, and because of Propositions 4.2 and 4.4, also individual-merge and marginal
convex.
Finally, we show that (N, V ) is cardinally convex. Let S, T ⊂ N such that S 6=
∅, T 6= ∅ and let xS ∈ V ◦(S), xT ∈ V ◦(T ). If S ⊂ T or T ⊂ S, then (3.6) is trivially
satisfied. If S ∩ T = ∅, (3.6) follows from superadditivity. We distinguish between
three further cases. First, if |S| = |T | = 3, then |S ∩ T | = 2 and S ∪ T = N .









i −2 ≤ 4+4−2 = 6. Hence, x ∈ V
◦(S∪T ). Second, if
|S| = 2, T = |3|, then |S∩T | = 1 and S∪T = N . Take xS∩T = (0, 0, 0, 0) ∈ V ◦(S∩T )
and define x as before. Then
∑
i∈S∪T xi ≤ 2 + 4− 0 = 6 and hence, x ∈ V
◦(S ∪ U).
Third, if |S| = |T | = 2, then |S ∩ T | = 1 and |S ∪ T | = 3. Take xS∩T = (0, 0, 0, 0) ∈
V ◦(S ∩ T ) and define x as before. Then
∑
i∈S∪T xi ≤ 2 + 2 − 0 = 4 and hence,
x ∈ V ◦(S ∪ U). From these three cases we conclude that (N, V ) is cardinally
convex. /
Next, we prove that ordinal convexity does not imply any of the other four types of
convexity.
Example 4.7 Consider the following NTU-game with player set N = {1, 2, 3}:
V ({i}) = (−∞, 0] for all i ∈ N,
V ({1, 2}) = {x ∈ R{1,2} |x1 ≤ 0, x2 ≤ 2},
V ({1, 3}) = {x ∈ R{1,3} |x1 + x3 ≤ 1},
V ({2, 3}) = {x ∈ R{2,3} |x2 ≤ 0, x3 ≤ 0},




This game (N, V ) is ordinally convex: let S, T ⊂ N such that S 6= ∅, T 6= ∅ and let
x ∈ RN such that xS ∈ V (S) and xT ∈ V (T ). We distinguish between four cases:
if S ⊂ T or T ⊂ S, (3.5) is trivially satisfied. If S ∩ T = ∅, (3.5) is equivalent
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to superadditivity, which is satisfied by this game. If S = {1, 2} and T = {1, 3},
then x1 ≤ 0 and hence, xS∩T ∈ V (S ∩ T ). Otherwise,
∑
i∈N xi ≤ 2 and hence,
xS∪T ∈ V (S ∪ T ). From these four cases we conclude that (3.5) is satisfied and
(N, V ) is ordinally convex. However, this game is not marginal convex, because the
marginal vector corresponding to σ = (1, 2, 3),Mσ(V ) = (0, 2, 0), does not belong to
the core, because player 1 and 3 have an incentive to leave the grand coalition. Using
Propositions 4.2 and 4.4, we conclude that (N, V ) is neither coalition-merge nor
individual-merge convex. Furthermore, this game is not cardinally convex: (0, 2, 0) ∈
V ◦({1, 2}) and (0, 0, 1) ∈ V ◦({1, 3}), but (0, 2, 0) + (0, 0, 1) = (0, 2, 1) /∈ V ◦({1}) +
V ◦(N). /
The example below shows that cardinal convexity does not imply any of the
marginalistic types of convexity.
Example 4.8 Consider the following NTU-game with player set N = {1, 2, 3, 4}:
V ({i}) = (−∞, 0] for all i ∈ N,
V ({1, 2}) = {x ∈ R{1,2} |x1 + x2 ≤ 2, x2 ≤ 1},
V (S) = {x ∈ RS | max
i∈S
xi ≤ 0} for other S ⊂ N, |S| = 2,
V ({1, 2, 3}) = {x ∈ R{1,2,3} |x1 + x2 + x3 ≤ 2, x3 ≤ 2},
V ({1, 2, 4}) = {x ∈ R{1,2,4} |x1 + x2 + x4 ≤ 2, x4 ≤ 1},
V (S) = {x ∈ RS | max
i∈S
xi ≤ 0} for other S ⊂ N, |S| = 3,
V (N) = {x ∈ RN |
∑
i∈N
xi ≤ 2, x3 ≤ 2, x4 ≤ 1}.
For the cardinal property (3.6), only the case with S = {1, 2, 3} and T = {1, 2, 4}
is nontrivial. Let xS ∈ V ◦(S), xT ∈ V ◦(T ). Because (1, 1, 0, 0) ∈ V ◦(S ∩ T ), it is
























Hence, x ∈ V (N) and (N, V ) is cardinally convex. For σ = (1, 2, 3, 4) we have
Mσ = (0, 1, 1, 0). The players of coalition {1, 2, 4} have an incentive to deviate






) ∈ V ({1, 2, 4}) gives them a strictly
higher payoff. Hence, Mσ(V ) /∈ C(V ) and (N, V ) is not marginal convex. Using
Propositions 4.2 and 4.4, we conclude that (N, V ) is neither coalition-merge nor
individual-merge convex. /
Finally, we show that the three marginalistic convexity properties do not imply
cardinal convexity.
Example 4.9 Consider the following NTU-game with player set N = {1, 2, 3}:
V ({i}) = (−∞, 0] for all i ∈ N,
V (S) = {x ∈ RS | max
i∈S
xi ≤ 1} for S ⊂ N, |S| > 1.
This game is a 1-corner game (see Section 5.2) and it follows from Proposition 5.4
that (N, V ) is coalition-merge convex (and hence, individual-merge and marginal
convex as well). This game is, however, not cardinally convex: take S = {1, 2}, T =
{2, 3} and take (1, 1, 0) ∈ V ◦(S), (0, 1, 1) ∈ V ◦(T ). Then (1, 1, 0) + (0, 1, 1) =
(1, 2, 1) /∈ V ◦(S ∩ T ) + V ◦(S ∪ T ). /
Summarising Propositions 4.2 and 4.4 and Examples 4.3 to 4.9, the five types of
convexity for NTU-games are related as is depicted in Diagram 1. An arrow from
one type of convexity to another indicates that the first one implies the second one.












The results in Diagram 1 hold for general n-player NTU-games. Some of the coun-
terexamples that we used to show that certain implications do not hold, however,
are games with four players. So, to round off this section, we state the relations
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between the five types of convexity for 3-player NTU-games in Diagram 2. The cor-
responding proofs and examples can be found in the appendix. To keep the picture





























5 Special Classes of Games
In this section, we look at our convexity notions in some specific classes of NTU-
games.
5.1 Hyperplane Games
A hyperplane game is an NTU-game (N, V ) such that for all coalitions S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅
we have
V (S) = {x ∈ RS |x>aS ≤ bS}
for certain aS ∈
◦
∆S = {x ∈ RS |
∑
i∈S xi = 1, x > 0} and b
S ∈ R. Note that every
entry of aS must be positive to ensure boundedness of V (S) ∩RS+. We denote the
class of all hyperplane games with player set N by HN . A property of hyperplane
games that we are going to use later on, is that these games possess a convex core.
Lemma 5.1 Let (N, V ) ∈ HN . Then C(V ) is a convex set.
Proof: Let aS, bS for all S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅ be as in the definition. Then








{x ∈ RN |x>Sa
S ≥ bS} ∩ V (N).
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C(V ) is the intersection of a finite number of halfspaces and a convex set and is
hence convex. 
A parallel hyperplane game is a hyperplane game (N, V ) such that the projection
of aN onto
◦
∆S equals aS for all coalitions S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅. We denote the class of
parallel hyperplane games with player set N by PN .
Lemma 5.2 Let (N, V ) ∈ HN . If (N, V ) is individually superadditive, then it
belongs to PN .
Proof: Assume that (N, V ) is individually superadditive and let aS, bS for all
S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅ be as in the definition. Let S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅. Take p ∈ V (S) and let
i, j ∈ S. Construct for all α ∈ R the vector pα = p + α(
aSi
aSj
ej − ei), where ej and ei
are unit vectors in RS. Then
p>αa




S − e>i a
S)








for all α ∈ R and hence, pα ∈ V (S). Next, define qα = (pα, 0N\S) for all α ∈ R.
Applying individual superadditivity |N\S| times yields qα ∈ V (N). Hence,
q>α a









S ) ≤ b
N
for all α ∈ R. The inequality can only hold for all α ∈ R if the expression between






. Hence, aS is the projection of aN onto
◦
∆S and (N, V ) ∈ PN . 
The following lemma relates the five convexity properties within the class of parallel
hyperplane games.
Lemma 5.3 Within PN , coalition-merge, individual-merge, marginal, ordinal and
cardinal convexity coincide.
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Proof: First of all, note that all five convexity properties are scale invariant: if
(N, V ) satisfies some form of convexity, then so does (N, V w) for every vector of
scale factors w ∈ RN++, where V
w(S) = {(wixi)i∈S |x ∈ V (S)} for all S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅.
In a parallel hyperplane game (N, V ), we can choose w in such a way that (N, V w)
corresponds to a TU-game. From this the assertion follows. 
The relations between the various forms of convexity for hyperplane games are sum-
marised in Diagram 3. For simplicity, the double arrow between cardinal and ordinal
convexity and the arrow from cardinal to marginal convexity have been omitted.
It follows from Lemmas 5.2 and 5.3 that within the class HN , coalition-merge,
individual-merge, ordinal and cardinal convexity coincide. Because there are hy-
perplane games that are marginal convex, but not parallel, marginal convexity is

































An NTU-game is called a 1-corner game if V (S) = {x ∈ RS |x ≤ uS} for some
uS ∈ RS for all S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅. We denote the class of 1-corner games with player
set N by CN . Monotonicity implies that for all S ⊂ T ⊂ N,S 6= ∅ we must have
uTS ≥ u
S. From this, superadditivity readily follows.




{x ∈ V (N) |x ≥Mσ(V )} (5.10)
In the following lemma we show that all 1-corner games are coalition-merge convex.
Proposition 5.4 Let (N, V ) ∈ CN . Then (N, V ) is coalition-merge convex.
Proof: Let U ⊂ N such that U 6= ∅, let S $ T ⊂ N\U such that S 6= ∅ and let
p ∈ WPar(S) ∩ IR(S), q ∈ V (T ) and r ∈ V (S ∪ U) such that rS ≥ p. Then it is
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sufficient to show that (q, rU) ∈ V (T ∪ U). First, q ∈ V (T ), so q ≤ uT . Similarly,
r ≤ uS∪U and hence, rU ≤ uS∪UU . Because of monotonicity, we have q ≤ u
T∪U
T and
rU ≤ uT∪UU . Therefore, (q, rU) ≤ u
T∪U and (q, rU) ∈ V (T ∪ U). 
It can be shown in a similar fashion that every 1-corner game is ordinally con-
vex. However, a 1-corner game need not be cardinally convex, as is illustrated by
Example 4.9.
5.3 Bargaining Games
A bargaining situation is a pair (F, d) where F ⊂ RN is a closed, convex and com-
prehensive set of attainable utility vectors and d ∈ F is a disagreement point (in F )
such that there exists a y ∈ F with y > d.
A bargaining situation with d = 0 gives rises to the bargaining game (N, V ) with
N = {1, . . . , n}, V (S) = {x ∈ RS |x ≤ 0} for all S $ N,S 6= ∅ and V (N) = F . We
denote the class of bargaining games with player set N by BN .
Proposition 5.5 Let (N, V ) ∈ BN . Then (N, V ) satisfies all five convexity prop-
erties.
Proof: Define the game (N,W ) with W (S) = RS− for all coalitions S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅.
Then (N,W ) trivially satisfies all five convexity properties. Because V (S) = W (S)
for all S $ N,S 6= ∅ and V (N) % W (N), it follows from the definitions (3.5)-(3.9)
that (N, V ) satisfies all five convexity properties as well. 
6 Solution Concepts
In this section we investigate how some solution concepts for NTU-games relate to
our convexity notions. A solution Ψ on a class ZN ⊂ NTUN of NTU-games is a
correspondence Ψ : ZN  RN, assigning to every V ∈ ZN a set of payoff vectors
Ψ(V ) ⊂ RN. A value is a function Ψ : ZN → RN assigning to every game V ∈ ZN
a single payoff vector Ψ(V ) ∈ RN.
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6.1 The MC-Value
The marginal based compromise value or MC-value was introduced in Otten et al.
(1998) and is defined as




where αV = max{α ∈ R+ |α
∑
σ∈Π(N)M
σ(V ) ∈ V (N)}.
Proposition 6.1 Let (N, V ) ∈ NTUN . If (N, V ) is marginal convex and belongs
to HN , CN or BN , then MC(V ) ∈ C(V ).
Proof: Assume (N, V ) is marginal convex. For (N, V ) ∈ HN and (N, V ) ∈ CN , the
statement follows from Lemma 5.1 and equation (5.10), respectively. If (N, V ) ∈ BN ,
then it is easily seen that the core includes the set on the right hand side of (5.10),
from which MC(V ) ∈ C(V ) follows. 
6.2 The Compromise Value
The compromise value is introduced in Borm et al. (1992) and is an extension of
the τ -value for TU-games (Tijs (1981)). The compromise value is a compromise
between two payoff vectors. The first one is the utopia vector K(V ), defined by
Ki(V ) = sup{t ∈ R | ∃a∈RN\{i}+
: (a, t) ∈ V (N), @b∈V (N\{i}) : b > a}
for all i ∈ N . The second one is the minimal right vector k(V ), defined by
ki(V ) = max
S:i∈S
ρSi (V )
for all i ∈ N , where ρSi (V ) is the remainder for player i after giving the other
members in S their utopia payoff:
ρSi (V ) = sup{t ∈ R | ∃a∈RS\{i} : (t, a) ∈ V (S), a > KS\{i}(V )}.
The following lemma comes from Borm et al. (1992).
Lemma 6.2 Let (N, V ) ∈ NTUN with x ∈ C(V ). Then k(V ) ≤ x ≤ K(V ).
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A game (N, V ) is called compromise admissible if k(V ) ≤ K(V ), k(V ) ∈ V (N) and
there does not exist a b ∈ V (N) such that b > K(V ). In view of Lemma 6.2, every
NTU-game with a nonempty core is compromise admissible. For a compromise
admissible game, the compromise value T (V ) is defined by
T (V ) = λVK(V ) + (1− λV )k(V ),
where
λV = max{λ ∈ [0, 1] |λK(V ) + (1− λ)k(V ) ∈ V (N)}.
An NTU-game (N, V ) is called semi-convex if k(V ) = 0. This definition extends
the definition of semi-convexity for TU-games in Driessen and Tijs (1985)3. In
TU-games, semi-convexity is implied by convexity and the next lemma states the
corresponding result for NTU-games.
Lemma 6.3 Let (N, V ) ∈ NTUN . If (N, V ) is marginal convex, then it is semi-
convex.
Proof: Assume (N, V ) is marginal convex. Let i ∈ N and let σ ∈ Π(N) be such
that σ(1) = i. By construction, Mσi (V ) = 0. Because of Lemma 6.2, we have
ki(V ) ≤ Mσi (V ) = 0. On the other hand, ki(V ) = maxS:i∈S ρ
S
i (V ) ≥ ρ
{i}
i (V ) = 0.
We conclude that ki(V ) = 0 for all i ∈ N and (N, V ) is semi-convex. 
As a corollary, we obtain the following proposition, in which compromise admissi-
bility follows from nonemptiness of the core.
Proposition 6.4 Let (N, V ) ∈ NTUN . If (N, V ) is marginal convex, then it is
compromise admissible and the compromise value is proportional to the utopia payoff
vector.
6.3 The Bargaining Set
The (Maschler) bargaining set for an NTU-game (N, V ) is defined as (cf. Aumann
and Maschler (1964))
3Contrary to the TU-game case, we do not require superadditivity in the definition of semi-
convexity.
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M(V ) = {x ∈ I(V ) | ∀i,j∈N∀S⊂N,i∈S,j/∈S∀y∈WPar(S),y>xS
∃T⊂N,i/∈T,j∈T∃z∈WPar(T ) : z ≥ (yS∩T , xT \S)}.
The bargaining set consists of those imputations x such that whenever player i
raises an objection against player j by cooperating with coalition S and promising
the members of S more than they get according to x, player j can counter this
objection by cooperating with coalition T , giving each player in S ∩ T at least the
amount they are promised by i.
It is a well-known result that in TU-games, this set is always nonempty and
contains the core. For convex TU-games, the bargaining set coincides with the core
(cf. Solymosi (1999)). In NTU-games, the bargaining set still contains the core, but
there are games in whichM(V ) is empty. In the next example we show that even
a strong form of convexity does not ensure that M(V ) = C(V ).
Example 6.5 Consider the same game as in Example 4.9, which is coalition-merge




, 1) does not belong to the core, but we show that
x ∈ M(V ). By symmetry, we only have to look at objections of player 1 against
player 3. Player 1 cannot object on his own, but only through coalition S = {1, 2}.
The maximum payoff vector player 1 can promise is y = (1, 1). But player 3 can
counter this objection through coalition T = {2, 3} and payoff vector z = (1, 1).
Hence, x ∈M(V ) although x /∈ C(V ) and (N, V ) is coalition-merge convex. /
Of course, there might be some subclass of NTUN for which coalition-merge con-
vexity (or even a weaker form of convexity) implies M(V ) = C(V ). The proof in
Solymosi (1999) for the corresponding TU-result uses excess games and it might be
interesting to investigate how this result can be extended to NTU-games, and in
particular, what definition of excess games can be used in this context.
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A Appendix
In this appendix we give the proofs and examples that relate the five convexity
properties for 3-player NTU-games. First, we prove that in 3-player NTU-games,
individual-merge convexity implies coalition-merge convexity.
Proposition A.1 Let (N, V ) ∈ NTUN such that |N | = 3. If (N, V ) is individual-
merge convex, then it is coalition-merge convex.
Proof: Assume (N, V ) is individual-merge convex. Then (N, V ) is individually
superadditive, and because there are only three players, superadditive. For the
coalition-merge property, if |U | = 1, then (3.7) is equivalent to (3.8). For |U | > 1,
we cannot find coalitions S and T such that S $ T ⊂ N\U and S 6= ∅. Hence, the
coalition-merge property is satisfied. 
Next, we show that in 3-player games, coalition-merge convexity implies ordinal
convexity.
Proposition A.2 Let (N, V ) ∈ NTUN such that |N | = 3. If (N, V ) is coalition-
merge convex, then it is ordinally convex.
Proof: Assume (N, V ) is coalition-merge convex. Let S1, S2 ⊂ N such that S1 6= ∅
and S2 6= ∅. If S1 ⊂ S2 or S2 ⊂ S1, then (3.5) is trivially satisfied. If S1 ∩ S2 = ∅,
(3.5) is satisfied because (N, V ) is superadditive. Otherwise, let x ∈ RN such that
xS1 ∈ V (S1) and xS2 ∈ V (S2) and suppose xS1∩S2 /∈ V (S1 ∩ S2). Then xS1∩S2 > 0
because |S1 ∩ S2| = 1. Next, define U = S2\S1, S = S1 ∩ S2 and T = S1 and
take p = 0 ∈ WPar(S) ∩ IR(S), q = xS1 ∈ V (T ) and r = xS2 ∈ V (S ∪ U).
Now rS = xS1∩S2 > 0 = p. Because (N, V ) is coalition-merge convex, there exists
an s ∈ V (T ∪ U) = V (N) such that s ≥ (q, rU) = (xT , xU) = xS1∪S2. Hence,
xS1∪S2 ∈ V (N) = V (S1 ∪ S2) and (N, V ) is ordinally convex. 
The following example shows that in 3-player NTU-games, marginal convexity need
not imply ordinal convexity.
Example A.3 Consider the following NTU-game with player set N = {1, 2, 3}:
V ({i}) = (−∞, 0] for all i ∈ N,
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V (S) = {x ∈ RS | max
i∈S
xi ≤ 1} for all S ⊂ N, |S| = 2,




The marginal vectors of this game are
σ (1, 2, 3) (1, 3, 2) (2, 1, 3) (2, 3, 1) (3, 1, 2) (3, 2, 1)
Mσ (0, 1, 1) (0, 1, 1) (1, 0, 1) (1, 0, 1) (1, 1, 0) (1, 1, 0)
and the core is
C(V ) = {(1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1)}.
This game is marginal convex. For ordinal convexity, consider S = {1, 2}, T = {2, 3}
and x = (1, 1, 1) ∈ RN. Then we have both xS ∈ V (S) and xT ∈ V (T ), but neither
xS∩T ∈ V (S ∩ T ) nor xS∪T ∈ V (S ∪ T ). Hence, (N, V ) is not ordinally convex. /
Finally, we show that in 3-player games, cardinal convexity implies coalition-merge
convexity.
Proposition A.4 Let (N, V ) ∈ NTUN such that |N | = 3. If (N, V ) is cardinally
convex, then it is coalition-merge convex.
Proof: Assume (N, V ) is cardinally convex. Then it is superadditive. For the
coalition-merge property, let U ⊂ N such that U 6= ∅ and let S $ T ⊂ N\U such
that S 6= ∅. Let p ∈ WPar(S) ∩ IR(S), q ∈ V ◦(T ) and r ∈ V ◦(S ∪ U) such that
rS ≥ p. Because |S| = 1, we have p = 0 and hence, rS ≥ 0. Next, define Ŝ = S ∪U .
Then q + r ∈ V ◦(Ŝ) + V ◦(T ) and because of cardinal convexity, there exists an
s ∈ V ◦(Ŝ ∩ T ) + V ◦(Ŝ ∪ T ) such that s ≥ q + r. Because |Ŝ ∩ T | = |S| = 1,
V ◦(Ŝ ∩ T ) = R− and s ∈ V ◦(Ŝ ∪ T ) = V (N) = V (T ∪ U). Furthermore, sT =
(sS, sT \S) ≥ (rS + qS, qT \S) ≥ q and sU = rU . So s satisfies (3.7) and (N, V ) is
coalition-merge convex. 
As a corollary, we obtain that in 3-player NTU-games, cardinal convexity implies
individual-merge, marginal and ordinal convexity as well.
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